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KILLING THE MESSENGER: THE USE OF NONDISCLOSURE
AGREEMENTS TO SILENCE WHISTLEBLOWERS
Jodi L. Short*
Nondisclosure agreements are a common feature of corporate life.
Employers routinely require their employees to sign such agreements to
protect the company's legal rights in trade secrets and other valuable bus-
iness information, the disclosure of which might hurt the company's
competitive position. Increasingly, however, employers are attempting to
expand the reach of nondisclosure agreements beyond these common-
place and legitimate uses. In recent years, employers have used garden-
variety employee-nondisclosure agreements to silence whistleblowers and
deprive the public of important health and safety information.
In two recent, high profile cases, courts permitted employers to si-
lence whistleblowers with nondisclosure agreements. In Baker v. General
Motors, a Michigan state court enforced GM's nondisclosure agreement
with Ronald Elwell) The former GM engineer was enjoined from testify-
ing about the dangers of GM's fuel tank design in products liability suits
against GM.2 In another widely publicized case, Brown & Williamson,
the third largest U.S. tobacco company, used nondisclosure agreements to
obtain a temporary restraining order against a former company executive
and researcher, prohibiting him from disclosing information about the
dangers of smoking cigarettes.3 Both rulings deprived the public of im-
portant health and safety information about the products of these two
companies.
Ronald Elwell worked for GM for thirty years. 4 Fifteen of those
years were spent as a member of GM's Engineering Analysis Group,
* Attorney, Shea & Gardner, Washington, DC. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1995.
The author was a member of the team of attorneys that defended Jeffrey Wigand against a suit
brought by his former employer, Brown & Williamson. The author would like to thank Michael Gi-
annotto, Laura Wertheimer and Matthew Fogelson for their insightful comments on drafts of this Ar-
ticle. The opinions presented in this Article are solely those of the author.
I. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F3d 811 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 657
(1998).
2. See id. at 818-20.
3. See Restraining Order, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, No. 95-CI-06560
(Jefferson Cir. Ct., Louisville, Ky. Nov. 21, 1995); see also Marie Brenner, The Man Who Knew Too
Much, VANITy FAIR, May 1996, at 170, 172.
4. See Baker v. General Motors, 118 S. Ct. 657, 660 (1998).
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where he studied the performance of GM vehicles involved in products
liability litigation. 5 Elwell's research concentrated on vehicular fires and
improving the fuel line designs of certain GM products. 6 In addition to
his duties as a researcher, Elwell assisted GM lawyers in defending prod-
ucts liability suits, and testified on GM's behalf in over 80 suits.7
For reasons that are not entirely clear, Elwell's relationship with his
employer soured, and he was discharged.8 Elwell claimed that he was un-
willing to continue providing assistance with GM's products liability de-
fense after he discovered that GM had withheld vital information from
him about the safety of its fuel tanks-rendering his prior testimony in
support of GM untruthful.9 GM claimed that Elwell did not get along
with his supervisors and was "disgruntled" over his retirement and sev-
erance packages.' 0 Convinced that GM's fuel tank design was unsafe, El-
well began to testify in products liability actions against GM, on behalf
of plaintiffs and their decedents who had been injured by the allegedly
faulty design."
Shortly after his termination, Elwell filed a wrongful discharge suit
in Michigan state court against GM. The corporation counterclaimed, al-
leging that Elwell had breached a fiduciary duty to GM by disclosing
privileged and confidential information. 2 After a motion by GM and a
hearing, the court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining Elwell from
"consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any person any of General Motors
Corporation's trade secrets[,] confidential information or matters of attorney-client
work product relating in any manner to the subject matter of any products liability
litigation whether already filed or [to be] filed in the future which Ronald Elwell
received, had knowledge of, or was entrusted with during his employments with
General Motors Corporation."' 13
To settle the wrongful discharge suit he filed against GM, Elwell en-
tered into a confidentiality agreement barring him from testifying against
GM in products liability cases unless ordered to do so by a court.' 4 The
court entered the terms of the settlement agreement as a permanent in-
5. See id. at 660-61.
6. See id. at 661.
7. See Meenach v. General Motors Corp., 891 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Ky. 1995).
8. See id. at 400.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 661.
12. See id.; Meenach, 891 S.W.2d at 400.




junction. 15 The agreementlinjunction substantially repeated the prelimi-
nary injunction, and went on to prohibit Elwell from
"testifying, without the prior written consent of General Motors Corporation, either
upon deposition or at trial, as an expert witness, or as a witness of any kind, and
from consulting with attorneys or their agents in any litigation already filed, or to
be filed in the future, involving General Motors Corporation as an owner, seller,
manufacturer and/or designer of the product(s) in issue.' 6
After Elwell was enjoined in accordance with the terms of this non-
disclosure agreement, he testified at a number of trials against GM.17 In
each case, GM tried to enjoin Elwell's participation on the basis of the
nondisclosure agreement and the Michigan injunction adopting it.'8 Some
courts sided with GM and quashed Elwell's testimony based on the in-
junction. 19 As one court put it,
G.M. bought Elwell's silence on any matters that could be damaging to G.M.'s in-
terest. Under the injunction, G.M. has not only prevented Elwell from speaking on
his own behalf, but no one else may find out what he knows, effectively blockad-
ing a litigant's search for the truth and for redress. 20
In a similar and contemporaneous case, Jeffrey Wigand, a former
vice president and chief researcher for Brown & Williamson, became the
highest-ranking executive to break ranks and reveal information about the
behind-the-scenes operations of a major tobacco company.2' His disclo-
sures were instrumental in building a case against the tobacco companies
and ultimately in fording the tobacco industry to the bargaining table to
negotiate a national tobacco settlement.22 Like General Motors, Brown &
Williamson used nondisclosure agreements to silence Wigand on issues
critical to the public health and safety. Based on several employment-
related nondisclosure agreements signed by Wigand, Brown & William-
15. See id.
16. Id. (quoting proposed permanent injunction).
17. See id. at 662; Meenach, 891 S.W.2d at 400.
18. See Meenzch, 891 S.W.2d at 400. Most of these courts admitted Elwell's testimony. See
infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811, 818-20 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118
S. Ct. 657 (1998).
20. Smith v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Shoemaker
v. General Motors, No. 91-0990-CV-W-8, at 10-11 (W.D. Mo. 1993)).
21. See Brenner, supra note 3, at 172-73; Suein L. Hwang, Brown & Williamson Sues Ex-
Executive Over Information Leaks to "60 Minutes", WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1995, at A3.
22. See Brenner, supra note 3, at 173; Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Leaders of the
Pact: How Seven Individuals With Diverse Motives Halted Tobacco's Wars, WALL ST. J., July 11,
1997, at Al.
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son persuaded a Kentucky state court to enter a temporary restraining or-
der prohibiting Wigand from disclosing anything he had learned during
his employment at Brown & Williamson without the company's
consent.13
In 1988, after a long career in health care, Wigand went to work for
Brown & Williamson, which reportedly approached him to develop a
"safer cigarette."' 24 Wigand claimed that he was shocked at the poor
quality of science being conducted at Brown & Williamsonz5 and disillu-
sioned with the company's secrecy and dishonesty about the dangers of
its products. 26 Wigand kept an extensive diary of his experiences at
Brown & Williamson27 and conducted independent research on the dan-
gers of certain common cigarette additives.28 He was fired in the summer
of 1992, reportedly for being "difficult to work with" and for "talking
too much." '29
After his termination, Wigand began a campaign to expose what he
viewed as grave misconduct and deception on the part of the tobacco in-
dusty.30 He filmed a segment for 60 Minutes, where he told investigative
reporter Mike Wallace that cigarettes are merely "a delivery device for
nicotine." 31 He became a "shadow expert" on the tobacco industry, ad-
vising anti-tobacco activists, U.S. Department of Justice investigators and
FDA regulators about various aspects of the industry's products and prac-
tices.32 Wigand also served as the "key witness in a singular legal at-
tempt by [state governments] to seek reimbursement of Medicaid ex-
penses resulting from smoking-related illnesses, '33 which resulted in a
landmark national tobacco settlement.34
Brown & Williamson launched a fierce counter-attack in response to
Wigand's activities. It reportedly hired someone to scrutinize Wigand's
past and private life and mounted a multi-million-dollar campaign to de-
23. See Restraining Order, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, No. 95-Cl-06560
(Jefferson Cir. Ct., Louisville, Ky. Nov. 21, 1995).
24. See Brenner, supra note 3, at 176.
25. See id. at 177.
26. See id. at 177-78.
27. See id. at 178.
28. See id. at 179.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 180-81.
31. Id. at 173.
32. See id. at 206.
33. Id. at 173.
34. See Freedman & Hwang, supra note 22, at Al.
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stroy Wigand by disseminating damaging charges against him.35 Brown
& Williamson also used litigation as a key component of its strategy to
silence Wigand. Based on several confidentiality agreements signed by
Wigand, Brown & Williamson sued to enjoin him from testifying in vari-
ous state suits and to collect damages based on other disclosures.36 Based
on the terms of the non-disclosure agreements, the Jefferson County Cir-
cuit Court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining Wigand from
disclosing any information about his experiences at Brown & William-
son.37 Brown & Williamson eventually dismissed its case against Wigand
as a part of the national tobacco settlement,38 but the restraining order
had been in effect for over a year. During that time Wigand could dis-
cuss his views on critical issues of public health and safety only upon
peril of contempt.
Although nondisclosure agreements effectively silenced
whistleblowers like Elwell and Wigand, there is little case law on the use
of nondisclosure agreements for these purposes. In the 1997-98 term, the
United States Supreme Court considered some important procedural as-
pects of Elwell's case.39 In Baker v. General Motors Corp.,40 the Court
considered whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution4 binds other state courts to enforce the Michigan state
court's injunction.42 The Court held that the courts of other states are not
bound by the Michigan injunction in deciding whether to permit Elwell's
testimony.43
While this decision clarifies a number of issues under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, it provides no substantive guidance on how nondisclo-
sure agreements should be interpreted when used against a whistleblower.
This question acquires a new urgency after Baker, because employers
like GM and Brown & Williamson can no longer rely on a home town
judgment obtained from a local court to block a whistleblower's testi-
mony in courts across the country. Courts must confront this issue ad hoc
35. See Brenner, supra note 3, at 174.
36. See Hwang, supra note 21, at A3.
37. See Restraining Order at 2, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, No. 95-Cl-
06560 (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Louisville, Ky. Nov. 21, 1995); Brenner, supra note 3, at 172.
38. See generally Kim Wessel, B&W Dismisses Lawsuit Against Wigand; Ex-Executive Still
Has Confidentiality Deal, CoumaER-JouaNAL .(Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 1, 1997, at 03B.
39. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998).
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
42. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 660.
43. See id. at 667-68.
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and decide how to balance the employer's right to bargain for an em-
ployee's silence on confidential business matters with the public's right to
information affecting health and safety.
This Article argues that, with certain narrow exceptions, an em-
ployer should not be able to use a nondisclosure agreement to silence a
whistleblower. This should be the case whether the disputed disclosures
are made in connection with litigation, to private or government investi-
gators, to the media, or to the public generally by some other means. Put
simply, there is a difference between disclosures of confidential, competi-
tive business information and disclosures concerning the public health
and safety. The law must recognize this critical distinction.
Part I of this Article discusses the case law on whether an employee
subject to a confidentiality agreement may testify in court against his or
her employer. These cases demonstrate that the vast majority of courts
permit such testimony, with restrictions placed solely on the revelation of
trade secrets and privileged information-as they would be for any wit-
ness. Part II argues further that, even outside the courtroom, nondisclo-
sure agreements entered into as part of an employment relationship are
unenforceable except to the extent that they are reasonable. This means
that they may protect only trade secrets, confidential information, and the
legitimate, competitive interests of the employer. Under these criteria,
employers likewise may not suppress public disclosures by
whistleblowers outside the litigation context, unless confidential informa-
tion or trade secrets are at issue. The Article concludes that the use of
employee nondisclosure agreements to silence whistleblowers stretches
these instruments far beyond their permissible boundaries, and courts
should not permit employers to misuse them in this fashion.
I. A NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT Is NOT ENFORCEABLE TO PREVENT AN
EMPLOYEE FROM PROVIDING TESTIMONY AGAINST THE EMPLOYER IN
CIVIL LITIGATION
Several courts have considered whether an employee bound by a
nondisclosure agreement is precluded from providing information argua-
bly covered by that agreement in the context of civil litigation. Although
there is some authority to the contrary, the majority of courts to consider
the question have permitted the employee to provide both fact and expert
testimony. Moreover, to the extent the employer may bar certain portions
of the testimony, such as trade secrets and privileged material, courts
place the burden on the employer to prove that the information the em-
[Vol. 60:12071212
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ployee may reveal by her testimony is in fact protectable. 44
Elwell's dispute with General Motors produced much of the existing
law on this issue. Elwell was called to testify in products liability cases
across the country, and GM opposed his testimony in a wide variety of
fora.45 Despite the broad language of the Michigan agreement/injunction
prohibiting his testimony on all matters related to his former employer,
these courts refused to issue a blanket injunction precluding Elwell's tes-
timony.46 Rather, most courts permitted Elwell's testimony on the condi-
tion that he not testify as to privileged matters and trade secrets.47
These courts reasoned that the public and institutional interests in
full and fair disclosure in litigation outweighed GM's interest in silencing
Elwell as to non-trade secret and non-privileged matters. 48 A California
appellate court refused to enforce the agreement/injunction, because "it
violates fundamental California public policy." 49 The court observed that
the agreement/injunction prohibited Elwell from "offering any testimony
whatsoever without the prior written consent of GM. On its face, it ex-
tends far beyond matters which might legitimately constitute attorney
work product or GM trade secrets." 50 Although its literal coverage was
broad, the court refused to enforce the agreement/injunction to its full ex-
tent because "[a]greements to suppress evidence have long been held
void as against public policy, both in California and in most common
law jurisdictions,"' 5' and the inevitable result of enforcing such a broad
agreement would be "the suppression of highly relevant, discoverable ev-
idence most probably very damaging to GM's position. '52
The Kentucky Supreme Court similarly observed that "the public in-
terest would not be served by a blanket prohibition as to [testimony on]
matters not within the scope of the attomey/client or work-product privi-
44. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
45. See Ake v. General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 869, 880-81 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing cases
from Washington, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Georgia); Smith v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Meenach v. General Motors Corp., 891 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1995).
46. See Ake, 942 F. Supp. at 880-81; Williams v. General Motors Corp., 147 F.R.D. 270, 272-
73 (S.D. Ga. 1993); Smith, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27-28; Meenach, 891 S.W.2d at 402.
47. See Ake, 942 E Supp. at 881; Williams, 147 ER.D. at 273; Smith, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24-
27; Meenach, 891 S.W.2d at 402.
48. See Ake, 942 F. Supp. at 881; Williams, 147 F.R.D. at 273; Smith, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27;
Meenach, 891 S.W.2d at 402.
49. Smith, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21.
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id. (quoting Williamson v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. Rptr. 39, 44 (Cal. 1978)).
52. Id. at 27.
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lege[sic], or which do not involve divulging trade secrets."'5 3 A district
court in Georgia addressing the same issue noted that "[a]ny interest [a
former employer] might have in silencing [a former employee] as to un-
privileged or non-trade-secret matters is outweighed by the public interest
in full and fair discovery."' 54 These courts applied this reasoning to per-
mit both fact and expert testimony.55
Courts have allowed employees to testify against their employers in
other contexts as well. In Favala v. Cumberland Engineering Co.,56 Jesus
Favala sued the manufacturer of a machine that had injured him when it
drew his hand into the device's rotating blades. 5 7 After filing suit, Favala
notified the manufacturer of his intent to depose Roy Gerstenberg, then
Vice President of the manufacturer's Product Integrity department.58 Soon
after the manufacturer was served with notice of the deposition, it en-
tered into a confidentiality agreement with Gerstenberg which prohibited
him from divulging 'the trade secrets and proprietary, confidential, pri-
vate or non-published information relating to the business, operation or
financial affairs of the Company. . . . "'9 Despite the agreement, Favala
took Gerstenberg's deposition.60 Gerstenberg's employer filed a motion to
bar Gerstenberg's testimony at trial, asserting, among other things, that
his testimony would violate the confidentiality agreement.61
The court concluded that Gerstenberg could testify "so long as he
did not divulge the substance or subject of his communications with [his
employer's] attorney." 62 The court rejected the employer's concern that
Gerstenberg might divulge confidential matters during his testimony, stat-
ing that "[t]his generalized fear ... does not justify the complete barring
of Gerstenberg's testimony in this case." 63
In determining what information is eligible for protection under this
standard, courts have held that the burden is on the employer to "estab-
lish that the specific matters [it objects to] are indeed subject to privilege
or protection." 64 In order to obtain protection for those portions of an
53. Meenach, 891 S.W.2d at 402.
54. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 147 F.R.D. 270, 273 (S.D. Ga. 1993).
55. See Williams, 147 F.R.D. at 273; Meenach, 891 S.W.2d at 402.
56. 17 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 1994).
57. See id. at 988-89.
58. See id. at 989.
59. Id. (quoting confidentiality agreement).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 990.
63. Id. at 991.
64. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 147 F.R.D. 270, 273 (S.D. Ga. 1993); accord Favala,
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employee's testimony which are legitimately protectable, the employer
cannot rely on a "generalized fear" that the employee may reveal dam-
aging information. Instead, it must identify specific information which
should be precluded from testimony.66
Although there is a strong trend among courts to permit testimony
by employees bound by nondisclosure agreements against their employ-
ers, there is some case law to the contrary.67 However, under close scru-
tiny, these cases do not undermine the reasoning of the majority of
courts discussed above. In Uniroyal Goodrich Tre Co. v. Hudson,68 the
Sixth Circuit upheld an injunction issued by a district court in Michi-
gan.69 The injunction precluded a former Uniroyal employee from testify-
ing as an expert witness against Uniroyal or consulting with plaintiffs'
counsel in a products liability action pending in Georgia.70 While em-
ployed by Uniroyal, the former employee signed a nondisclosure agree-
ment providing that he would maintain in confidence at all times during
and after his employment, all information gained in the course of or aris-
ing from his employment. 71 After leaving his employment, the former
employee became an expert witness and consultant for plaintiffs in prod-
ucts liability actions pending against Uniroyal. 72
Uniroyal sought to enjoin expert testimony by the former employee
on the grounds that such testimony would violate the nondisclosure
agreement and would result in the disclosure of confidential information
harmful to Uniroyal's business interests.73 The district court preliminarily
enjoined the former employee from using or disclosing any Uniroyal
trade secrets or confidential information, or revealing information about
certain topics enumerated in the preliminary injunction, except "in an of-
ficial proceeding of a- court of record." 74 Despite the breadth of the non-
disclosure agreement, which precluded the disclosure of any information
17 F.3d at 990; Smith v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 28 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting
Williams, 147 F.R.D. at 273); Meenach v. General Motors Corp., 891 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Ky. 1995).
65. Favala, 17 F.3d at 991.
66. See Williams, 147 F.R.D. at 273.
67. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, 97 F.3d 1452, No. 95-1130, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25322 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996) (unpublished table decision); Zanders v. National R.R. Pas-
senger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127 (6th Cir. 1990).
68. 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25322.
69. See id. at *30-31.
70. See id.
71. See id. at *3.
72. See id. at *4.
73. See id. at *5.
74. See id. at *8 (quoting injunction).
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learned while at Uniroyal,75 the preliminary injunction prohibited only the
disclosure of trade secret and confidential information; it did not place
any further limits on the former employee's ability to testify at deposition
or at trial.76 Thus, at least with respect to trial or deposition testimony,
the Uniroyal preliminary injunction is consistent with the policies ex-
pressed in the cases discussed above.
After this preliminary injunction was entered, the former employee
served as an expert consultant to the Georgia products liability plaintiffs
by reviewing and tabulating certain information for plaintiffs' counsel.77
Uniroyal, of course, was not present during these consultations and thus
could not have posed objections to the revelation of particular informa-
tion. The district court ruled that the employee's consultations with plain-
tiffs' counsel violated the preliminary injunction and, as a penalty, issued
a broader injunction completely prohibiting the former employee from
testifying as an expert witness at the Georgia trial. 78
In upholding the broader injunction, the Sixth Circuit agreed with
the district court that the information the former employee had disclosed
to the Georgia plaintiffs "qualified for trade secret protection. ' 79 The
court observed that this, as well as other confidential information, was
disclosed to plaintiffs' attorneys in violation of the district court's origi-
nal preliminary injunction, and it was therefore appropriate for the dis-
trict court to enjoin him from testifying as an expert.8 0 The Sixth Circuit
also noted that such an injunction did not violate public policy by unduly
interfering with the fact finding process, because the injunction did not
preclude the former employee from testifying "as a fact witness at any
trial." 1' In addition, the court noted that "prohibiting [him] from testify-
ing as an expert . . . will not unduly burden plaintiffs" 82 because he "is
not the only tire failure expert available to these parties, and plaintiffs are
perfectly free to hire another expert tire failure analyst to support their
claims." 3
Despite their holdings, the Uniroyal decisions substantially support
the reasoning of the decisions permitting the disputed employee testi-
75. See id. at *3.
76. See id. at *7.
77. See id. at *8-9.
78. See id. at *9, *21.
79. Id. at *26.
80. See id. at *18-19.
81. Id. at *30.
82. Id. at *30-31.
83. Id. at *31.
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mony. Even though the Uniroyal nondisclosure agreement prohibited the
employee from disclosing any matters learned while at Uniroyal, the dis-
trict court's initial injunction did not prevent the employee from re-
vealing all information learned during the course of his employment. 84
Rather, it only prohibited him from revealing trade secret and confiden-
tial business information. 5 Moreover, he was not precluded in any way
from testifying as an expert at trial.86 It was only after the employee vio-
lated the terms of the initial preliminary injunction that the district court
issued the broader injunction barring all testimony.87
Another Sixth Circuit case addressing this issue is Zanders v. Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corporation." In that case, the court refused
on procedural grounds to disturb an Ohio injunction prohibiting a former
employee from disclosing confidential information about her former rail-
road employer.89 Under the supervision of the railroad's attorneys, the
former employee had "investigated and drafted answers to employment
discrimination complaints" brought against the railroad. 90 Upon her resig-
nation, the employee entered into an agreement not to disclose any confi-
dential information obtained in the course of her employment.9' Subse-
quently, the employee was listed as a witness for employment
discrimination claimants suing the railroad.92 Concerned that the former
employee might disclose attorney-client or work product privileged infor-
mation, the railroad filed suit against her in Ohio state court and obtained
an injunction barring her from disclosing any information acquired in the
course of her employment.93 The injunction did not apply, however, to
disclosures 'required by law in a proceeding in which [the railroad]
ha[s] the opportunity to assert any applicable claim of privilege.' 94 After
ruling against the former employee on procedural grounds, the Sixth Cir-
cuit opined in dicta that the Ohio injunction did not violate public policy.
The court reasoned that although the former employee was a party to
privileged communications in the course of her employment, the Ohio in-
84. See id. at *8.
85. See id. at *7.
86. See id. at *8.
87. See id. at *9.
88. 898 F.2d 1127 (6th Cir. 1990).
89. See id. at 1129, 1136.
90. Id. at 1129.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 1129-30.
94. Id. at 1130 (quoting injunction).
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junction specifically allowed her to testify as a fact witness in any court
proceeding in which the railroad would have the ability to raise objec-
tions.95 As in Uniroyal, the Zanders court drew a distinction between dis-
closures made in connection with litigation (where the railroad could ob-
ject, seal the record, or otherwise act to protect its interests) and other
extra-litigation communications.
In sum, there is broad agreement among courts that an employer
cannot use a nondisclosure agreement to prohibit an employee from par-
ticipating as a witness in civil proceedings. This is especially true where
the employer has the opportunity to participate in the proceedings and
object to the disclosure of protectable material such as privileged infor-
mation and trade secrets. This is a fair and sensible approach, consistent
with the strong public policy favoring full disclosure in litigation. Conse-
quently, a nondisclosure agreement should not prevent a whistleblower
from testifying against her employer.
II. AN EMPLOYMENT-RELATED NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT Is NOT
ENFORCEABLE TO PREVENT A WHISTLEBLOWER'S DISCLOSURES OF
THE EMPLOYER'S WRONGDOING OUTSIDE THE LITIGATION
CONTEXT, TO THE MEDIA OR TO THE PUBLIC GENERALLY
The legal issues surrounding whistleblower disclosures are much
more complicated than the above discussion suggests, because
whistleblowers can utilize countless avenues outside the controlled con-
fines of judicial proceedings to reveal, prevent or punish their employers'
wrongdoing. For example, a whistleblower might approach the media and
provide interviews, sources or documents to reporters, or she might serve
as a media consultant on the issues in question. She may participate in a
law enforcement investigation, which would entail disclosures to govern-
ment investigators or other law enforcement personnel. The
whistleblower might even opt to operate outside all these traditional
structures and post the damaging information on the internet.
Different questions are raised by disclosures outside the litigation
context, where there is no countervailing interest in full and fair disclo-
sure, and where the employer has no notice or opportunity to assert ap-
plicable objections. As discussed above, some courts have explicitly
drawn distinctions between permissible disclosures made in litigation and
impermissible disclosures made outside the structured court environ-
95. See id. at 1133-34.
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ment.96 Nevertheless, there are substantial limits on what types of disclo-
sures a confidentiality agreement may be used to restrict outside the liti-
gation context, because employee non-disclosure agreements are restraints
on trade.97 Even in a purely commercial context, an employee nondisclo-
sure agreement is unenforceable unless the agreement is reasonable, 98
meaning that it protects only the employer's legitimate business interests
in confidential or trade secret information. Employment-related nondis-
closure agreements that restrict the free flow of information outside these
limits should be struck down or enforced only insofar as they are consis-
tent with these limits. In most cases involving whistleblowers, a nondis-
closure agreement cannot meet this standard.
A. Employment-Related Nondisclosure Agreements Are Not Enforceable
Unless They Are Reasonable
Contracts in restraint of trade are against public policy and are un-
enforceable unless they are reasonable. 99 "A promise is in restraint of
trade if its performance would limit competition in any business or re-
strict the promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation."' 10 It has long
been held that covenants not to compete restrain trade and thus are disfa-
vored by the law.'0' Covenants not to compete typically prohibit an em-
ployee from working for a competitor of the employer or from establish-
ing a competing business for a certain period of time after the employee
terminates her employment.'02 Unless the parameters of such agreements
are narrowly drawn, they would prevent former employees from ob-
taining new employment. 0 3 Consequently, courts scrutinize such agree-
ments to ensure they are no more restrictive than necessary to protect the
employer's legitimate competitive interests.' 4
96. See notes 76 and 95 and accompanying text.
97. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 519 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Nondis-
closure] covenants are agreements in restraint of an individual's freedom of trade."); Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 469 (N.D. Ga. 1986) ("Nondisclosure covenants ... affect
the dissemination of information necessary to free competition.").
98. See Prudential, 629 F. Supp. at 469.
99. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(l) (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
100. Id. § 186(2).
101. See ANTHONY C. VALIULIS, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: FORMS, TAcTcs, AND THE LAW
§ 1.6, at 6 (1985).
102. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, § 188 cmt. g ; DONALD J. ASPELUND &
CHARLES S. BAKER, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETmON LAW § 3.02 (1997).
103. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, § 188 cmt. g.
104. See generally VAtuuus, supra note 101, § 1.4, at 4.
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There has been significantly more controversy over whether nondis-
closure agreements, like covenants not to compete, so severely limit
competition that they should be considered disfavored restraints on
trade. 05 One treatise on employment contracts asserts:
It is often easier to uphold and enforce a non-disclosure clause than a clause re-
stricting competition. The reason for this is obvious. In a typical non-disclosure
clause, though employees may agree not to disclose certain confidential informa-
tion. ... they are not otherwise restricted from competing .... These agreements
restrain trade, if at all, to a much less extent than do covenants not to compete.1 6
As the economy becomes increasingly information-driven, however,
these historic distinctions are becoming irrational and meaningless. In
fact, because nondisclosure agreements restrict speech, they might be
viewed as even more insidious than covenants not to compete. In any
event, employee nondisclosure agreements restrain trade in at least three
ways. First, nondisclosure agreements undermine competition in the gen-
eral economy by circumscribing the free flow of information.10 Free in-
formation flow is an essential element of competition, and restricting it in
any way restrains competition. 08 Second, nondisclosure agreements re-
strain trade much like covenants not to compete by making it more diffi-
cult for individuals to obtain new employment in the same field.109 The
skills and industry knowledge an employee learns at one job often consti-
tute her most valuable assets in seeking and obtaining a subsequent job.
Therefore "[riestraints cannot be lightly placed upon [an employee's]
right to compete in the area of his greatest worth." 0
Finally, nondisclosure agreements restrain the employee's ability to
trade on the information she has obtained. Trafficking in information is,
in and of itself, a lucrative economic activity in today's economy. A per-
son who possesses valuable information of interest to the public may
have numerous profitable opportunities available, including serving as a
confidential media source, writing a tell-all book, becoming an expert
witness, or working as a litigation or media consultant. The very real ec-
onomic value of these opportunities cannot be ignored simply because
105. See 1 KuRT H. DECKER, CovENANTs NOT TO CoNETE § 3.7, at 56 (2d ed. 1993).
106. Id.
107. See North Am. Paper Co. v. Unterberger, 526 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
108. See ASPELUND & BAKER, supra note 102, § 2.0111] (describing the public interest in the
free flow of information).
109. See generally id. § 3.02.
110. Slijepcevich v. Caremark Inc., No. 95 C 7286, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110, at *7 (N.D.
IM. Jan. 4, 1996).
[Vol. 60:12071220
NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS
some might find them distasteful. If a nondisclosure agreement prohibits
an employee from pursuing these economic opportunities, it restrains
trade. This is not to say that these activities and disclosures must be per-
mitted. Rather, it means that if an agreement purports to preclude an in-
dividual from pursuing economic opportunity, it restrains trade and must
be scrutinized. While it may be decided in a given case that an em-
ployer's interest in confidentiality outweighs an employee's interest in
selling her story to the National Enquirer, the analysis should be per-
formed on a case-by-case basis, as it is for all restraints of trade.
Courts are increasingly recognizing the parallels between nondisclo-
sure and noncompete agreements. Although courts are not unanimous on
this issue,"' significant judicial authority holds that nondisclosure agree-
ments restrain trade and should be scrutinized under the same or similar
standards as covenants not to compete." 2 Especially where the employer
has drafted a broad nondisclosure agreement with undefined restrictions,
nondisclosure and noncompetition agreements are almost indistinguish-
able. For instance, it is not uncommon for employers to draft extremely
broad nondisclosure agreements to ensure the most expansive coverage of
information. One such agreement defined "confidential information" as
111. See, e.g., Roto-Die Co. v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1522-23 (W.D. Va. 1995) (recogniz-
ing a distinction between noncompete and nondisclosure agreements); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v.
Hudson, 856 F. Supp. 348, 351-52 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667
A.2d 729, 735 n.7 (Pa. Super. 1995); Bell Fuel Corp. v. Cattolico, 544 A.2d 450, 458 & n.5 (Pa.
Super. 1988); see also Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 663 (Tex. App. 1992) (stating
that nondisclosure agreements do not restrain trade).
112. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 519 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
that nondisclosure covenants "are agreements in restraint of an individual's freedom of trade");
AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that broad confidential-
ity agreements constitute unreasonable restraints on trade), superseded by 765 ILL. COMp. STAT.
1065/8 (West 1999); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Baum, 629 F Supp. 466, 471 (N.D. Ga. 1986)
("Nondisclosure covenants adjudged overbroad are considered an unfair restraint upon competi-
tion."); SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 658 F. Supp. 362, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("[Any agreement
which seeks to restrict post-employment activities is subject to the same standards [as noncompeti-
tion clauses]."); Kloeckner-Pentaplast of Am., Inc. v. Desantis, No. 84-0317-R, 1985 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22857, at *17-20 (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 1985) (stating that nondisclosure agreement is a restraint
of trade); see also Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 462, 471 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (analyzing nondisclosure agreements and covenants not to compete as restrictive covenants
governed by the same criteria); American Shippers Supply Co. v. Campbell, 456 N.E.2d 1040, 1043
(Ind. CL App. 1983); North Am. Paper, 526 N.E.2d at 623-24; State Med. Oxygen & Supply, Inc. v.
American Med. Oxygen Co., 782 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Mont. 1989); Service Ctrs. of Chicago, Inc. v.
Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. CL 1989) (finding that an agreement prohibiting disclo-
sure of any information learned on the job "amounts in effect to a post-employment covenant not to
compete"); Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 679 P.2d 206, 211 (Kan. 1984) (stating that enforce-
ment of a nondisclosure agreement "would unreasonably infringe upon appellant's right to earn a
living").
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all information provided to the employee during the course of his em-
ployment that was related in any way to the employer's business. 113 Read
literally, this kind of agreement covers everything from confidential cus-
tomer lists to the brand of copy paper used by the employer. Enforced
literally, it could produce absurd results, and it would certainly restrict an
employee's ability to function in a similar job."4 One court observed that
enforcement of such a nondisclosure agreement "amounts in effect to a
post-employment covenant not to compete." 15
Regardless whether the courts of a state have explicitly equated non-
disclosure agreements and covenants not to compete, there is broad judi-
cial consensus that employee nondisclosure agreements, like covenants
not to compete, must satisfy a test of "reasonableness" in order to be en-
forced." 6 The "reasonableness" test courts have articulated takes into ac-
count the employer's interests in protecting certain information, the em-
ployee's interest in obtaining new employment of her choice, and the
public policy in fostering the spread of ideas to promote competition." 7
In general,
an agreement in restraint of trade is reasonable if, on consideration of the subject,
nature of the business, situation of the parties and circumstances of the particular
case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the
[employer] and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose
undue hardship on the [employee].118
113. See Service Ctrs. of Chicago, 535 N.E.2d at 1133-34.
114. Enforced literally, the terms of these agreements would prohibit an employee from dis-
cussing innocuous matters such as what kind of coffee the employer serves in addition to matters
fundamental to the employee's professional livelihood. For example, information learned from trade
publications supplied by the employer and read on the job could be complicated. See id. at 1135
("[E]mployee has a right to make use of the general knowledge and skills acquired through experi-
ence in pursuing the occupation for which he is best suited."); Great Lakes Carbon, 497 F. Supp. at
470.
115. Service Ctrs. of Chicago, 535 N.E.2d at 1137.
116. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 519 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that nondisclosure agree-
ments "are enforceable only if they can survive scrutiny under the 'rule of reason"'); Henry Hope
X-Ray Prods. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying the relevant state
law, nondisclosure agreements must be reasonable); Salsbury Lab. v. Merieux Lab., Inc., 735 F.
Supp. 1545, 1553-54 (M.D. Ga. 1988); Kloeckner-Pentaplast, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22857, at *17-
18 (same); Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 275 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Great Lakes Carbon,
497 F. Supp. at 471; Julius Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 233 P.2d 977, 1001-02 (Colo. 1951);
Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Ga. 1973); Disher v. Fulgoni, 464
N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); American Shippers Supply, 456 N.E.2d at 1043; Puritan-
Bennett, 679 P.2d at 211; State Med. Oxygen & Supply, 782 P.2d at 1275; 1st Am. Sys., Inc. v.
Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51, 57 (S.D. 1981).
117. See Kloeckner-Pentaplast, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22857, at *18; Salsbury Lab., 735 F.
Supp. at 1553-54; Disher, 464 N.E.2d at 643; State Med. Oxygen and Supply, 782 P.2d at 1275.
118. Hammons v. Big Sandy Claims Serv., 567 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (citing
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Courts analyzing covenants not to compete typically impose an addi-
tional requirement that is not readily applicable to the analysis of nondis-
closure agreements. These courts require that covenants not to compete
contain reasonable temporal and geographic limits on the employer's
prohibitions." 9 Thus, a covenant not to compete will be found reasonable
only if it restricts an employee's employment options for a limited period
of time and in a limited geographic area. Although some courts have
adopted this approach to analyze nondisclosure agreements, 120 it is not
entirely satisfying in this context. Nondisclosure agreements present more
complex time/space problems than covenants not to compete, because in-
formation is not so easily bridled or monitored as the movement of a sin-
gle employee. Thus, although one court calls nondisclosure agreements
lacking duration and geographic limits "palpably unfair,"' 21 others have
explicitly rejected time and space limitations on nondisclosure agree-
ments because the release of secret information can be harmful whenever
and wherever it occurs. 22 Also, as one court observed, time limits are
built into the agreement when confidential information is at issue because
the secrecy obligation, by definition, can remain in effect only so long as
the information in question remains secret.' 23 Geographic limits are also
irrelevant in an age where information can be transmitted globally at the
touch of a button. Consequently, while the "reasonableness" test should
be applied to nondisclosure agreements as it is to other restraints of
trade, these particular criteria cannot be readily imported from the case
law on covenants not to compete.
There are two major components to the "reasonableness" standard
courts have applied to employment-related nondisclosure agreements.
First, regardless what they purport to cover, such nondisclosure agree-
Ceresia v. Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359, 364 (Ky. 1951)).
119. See Great Lakes Carbon, 497 F Supp. at 471; State Med. Oxygen & Supply, 782 P.2d at
1275; 1st Am. Sys., 311 N.W.2d at 59; Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 663 (Tex. App.
1992).
120. See Henry Hope X-Ray Prods., 674 F.2d at 1342 (stating that nondisclosure agreement
must contain reasonable duration and geographic limitations); Trailer Leasing Co. v. Associates Com-
mercial Corp., No. 96 C 2305, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9654, at *17 (N.D. IlL. July 9, 1996); Great
Lakes Carbon, 497 F. Supp. at 471; North Am. Paper Co. v. Unterberger, 526 N.E.2d 621, 624 (I11.
App. CL 1998); State Med. Oxygen & Supply, 782 P.2d at 1275; 1st Am. Sys., 311 N.W.2d at 59.
121. Disher, 464 N.E.2d at 644.
122. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 469 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (stating
that nondisclosure agreement must have time restriction but need not have geographic restriction);
Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 149 (Ga. 1973); Zep Mfg., 824 S.W.2d at
663 (concluding that time and geographical limits are not prerequisites to enforceability of nondisclo-
sure agreements).
123. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, 856 F. Supp. 348, 352 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
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ments may only protect trade secrets and confidential information. Sec-
ond, nondisclosure agreements may only be used to protect the legitimate
competitive interests of the employer. Contracts which attempt to restrict
the disclosure of corporate wrongdoing are not reasonable under this
standard and thus should not be enforceable against whistleblowers.
B. Employment-Related Nondisclosure Agreements May Only Protect
Trade Secrets and Confidential Information
The crux of the "reasonableness" standard is the requirement that
the information protected by a confidentiality agreement must be confi-
dential. Courts are in broad agreement that nondisclosure agreements, no
matter how extensive their coverage, may only be used to restrict the dis-
closure of trade secret and confidential information. 24 Even courts that
do not regard nondisclosure agreements as restraints of trade have upheld
them only insofar as they protect confidential information.125 Thus, courts
will strike down broad agreements purporting to cover non-confidential
information, or will enforce these agreements only to the extent neces-
sary to prevent disclosure of trade secret or confidential information. 126
There is extensive literature and state law on what entitles certain
material to protection as a trade secret. 27 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(U.T.S.A.), which has been adopted in forty-one states and the District of
Columbia,'2 is the leading framework for trade secret protection. 29 The
U.T.S.A. defines "trade secret" as:
124. See Prudential, 629 F. Supp. at 471-72; Durham, 198 S.E.2d at 149-50; Puritan-Bennett
Corp. v. Richter, 679 P.2d 206, 211 (Kan. 1984); Service Ctrs. of Chicago, Inc. v. Minogue, 535
N.E.2d 1132, 1133-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); 1st Am. Sys., 311 N.W.2d at 57.
125. See Zep Mfg., 824 S.W.2d at 663 (finding nondisclosure agreement is not a restraint of
trade because it prevents only the disclosure of trade secrets and confidential information); Bell Fuel
Corp. v. Cattolico, 544 A.2d 450, 460 (Pa. Super. 1988) (stating that nondisclosure agreements are
not a restraint of trade but to be afforded protection "the information must be a particular secret of
the employer, not a general secret of the trade, and must be of peculiar importance to the conduct of
the employer's business"); 1st Am. Sys., 311 N.W.2d at 57 (holding that nondisclosure agreements
are not restraints on trade, but will not be enforced if "a trade secret or confidential relationship
does not exist").
126. It is important to remember that this analysis is not about contract construction. The
"reasonableness" standard is a judicially constructed and imposed test to regulate the use of private
contracts which purport to restrain speech and trade. Thus, the analysis is not about what the words
of the nondisclosure agreement say. Rather, courts must decide what constitutes trade secret and con-
fidential information and whether that information is covered by the terms of the agreement.
127. A complete discussion of this literature is outside the scope of this Article.
128. UNrn. TRADE SEcRErs Acr, 14 U.L.A. 152 (Supp. 1998).




information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique or process, that
(i) derives independent economic value actual or potential, from not being gener-
ally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to main-
tain its secrecy.'30
Although this definition of trade secret can embrace a broad range
of proprietary information, the information in question must satisfy cer-
tain elements in order to qualify for trade secret protection. First, a trade
secret must have a certain degree of novelty, although it need not rise to
the level required for a patent.'3' Second, it must have economic value in
that a competitor would materially benefit from knowing the information
because it would not have to spend time and money to create the same
information independently.1 32 Third, the information cannot be generally
known or readily ascertainable. 133 Finally, the information must be the
subject of reasonable,efforts to maintain secrecy. 34
Proving each element necessary to receive trade secret protection
can place an onerous burden on an employer. Moreover, although this
definition of trade secret is broad enough to encompass most material an
employer would wish to protect, its precise coverage varies from state to
state. Courts in many states have refused to extend its protection to
forms of business information not traditionally thought of as trade
secrets, such as customer lists and marketing information. 35 Conse-
130. UNo. TRADE SEcRETs Acr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
131. See KINNEY & LANGE, supra note 129, at 354.
132. See id. at 355.
133. See id. at 355-57.
134. See id. at 357.
135. Compare Saunders v. Florence Enameling Co., 540 So. 2d 651, 654 (Ala. 1988) (af-
firming that pipe coating process not known outside manufacturer's company constitutes trade se-
cret), and Proctor & Gamble Disirib. Co. v. Vasseur, 275 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Ky. 1955) ("The right to
discovery and inspection of matters which constitute trade secrets and the corresponding right to
maintain them, or, in some instances, to safeguard them, present difficult questions of definition and
of limitation on the court's discretion."), and Aries Info. Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Management Sys.
Corp., 366 N.W.2d 366, 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that a specially designed computer
software system not known to others in the industry constitutes trade secret); with Aero Drapery of
Ky., Inc. v. Engdahl, 507 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Ky. 1974) (stating that forms and charts developed and
used by drapery manufacturer did not constitute trade secrets), and Bim v. Runion, 222 S.W.2d 657,
659 (Ky. 1949) (holding customer lists did not constitute trade secrets). See also AMP Inc. v.
Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1205 (7th Cir. 1987) (denying trade secret status to employer's cus-
tomer and financial information where employer could not "point to any tangible work product, such
as blueprints, designs, plans, processes, or other technical specifications, at risk of misappropria-
tion"), superseded by 765 ILu Comp. STAT. 1065/8 (West 1999).
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quently, there are gaps in trade secret coverage that may leave a substan-
tial portion of an employer's valuable business information unprotected.
As a result, courts have permitted employers to protect confidential
information in addition to trade secrets through the use of nondisclosure
agreements. 36 Unfortunately, there is scant discussion of what courts
mean by the term "confidential" in the context of nondisclosure agree-
ments. This is true even though the vast majority of courts have required
that non-trade secret information covered by nondisclosure agreements be
confidential. 137
Courts construing nondisclosure agreements have primarily at-
tempted to draw the parameters of confidentiality by defining what it is
not. First, there is broad consensus that confidential information does not
include the general skill, knowledge and experience an employee has
gained on the job.'38 Thus, a nondisclosure agreement may not be used to
preclude him from making use of those assets. One court stated that
"one who has worked in a particular field cannot be compelled to erase
from his mind all of the general skills, knowledge, acquaintances and
overall expertise acquired during his tenure with the former employer."' 39
To hold an employee to such a standard would create too severe a re-
straint on the employee's ability to earn a living.140 Moreover, an em-
ployer may not overcome this requirement by showing that the employee
would be able to obtain some other job without using the general skills
and knowledge she obtained through her prior employment.' 4 An em-
ployee has a right to compete in the area of her greatest worth. 42
For instance, Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Koch Industries, Inc. in-
volved an individual who had prepared bids for petroleum coke supplies
136. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
137. See generally VAuuLus, supra note 101, § 2.5, at 21 ("To be protectible, the information
must truly be confidential.").
138. See Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 679 P.2d 206, 211 (Kan. 1984) ("Hiring agreements
which restrict communication of ideas in general ...have been held unreasonable."); see also
Slijepcevich v. Caremark, Inc., No. 95C7286, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4,
1996) (holding that one cannot restrain employee's use of general skills, knowledge, and expertise);
Ashland Chemical, Inc. v. Lombardino, No. 93-2434, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13736, at *13 (E.D.
La. Sept. 23, 1993); Samuel Bingham Co. v. Maron, 651 F Supp. 102, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Great
Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 462, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); SI Handling Sys-
tems v. Heisley, 658 F. Supp. 362, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (stating that nondisclosure agreement cannot
restrict use in other employment of general knowledge); Brunner v. Hand Indus., 603 N.E.2d 157,
160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
139. Disher v. Fulgoni, 464 N.E.2d 639, 642 (Il1. App. Ct. 1984).
140. See id.; see also Samuel Bingham, 651 F. Supp. at 106 & n.4.
141. See Slijepcevich, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110, at *6-7.
142. See id. (quoting ILG, Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. 1971)).
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for his former employer.143 The court held that a nondisclosure agreement
did not preclude him from using his general knowledge of the industry
and pricing principles gained through his old job to prepare similar bids
for a new employer. 44 These bid estimates were not protectable, because
they were "dependent on too many unpredictable variables and personal
judgments entering into the equation."1 45 Consequently, they could not
reasonably be restrained by a nondisclosure agreement.
46
Courts also agree that, regardless what its terms purport to protect, a
nondisclosure agreement will not be enforced to bar disclosure of pub-
licly available data or information that could be obtained by analyzing
publicly available data. 47 Thus, the components of a compilation of pre-
viously uncollected but otherwise publicly available information are not
protectable with a nondisclosure agreement.'" Also unprotected is infor-
mation which individuals with skills comparable to the employee's could
ascertain by examining publicly available data or products. 49 A Kentucky
court refused to enforce a nondisclosure agreement by which an em-
ployer sought to prevent his former employee from disclosing informa-
tion about a device used for timing harness races. 50 The court found it
"difficult to see" how information relating to this device could be confi-
dential given that it was a publicly available commodity which "almost
anyone could examine."''
Courts have placed another important limitation on the employer's
ability to classify information as confidential under a nondisclosure
agreement. Many have placed the burden on the employer to define pre-
cisely what material it considers confidential, both in the nondisclosure
agreement itself and in the proceedings to enforce it. Courts often strike
down broad nondisclosure agreements which give no fair notice to the
employee of what information cannot be disclosed. 52 Such agreements
143. 497 F. Supp. 462, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
144. See id. at 469-70.
145. Id. at 469.
146. See id.
147. See ASPELUND & BAKER, supra note 102, § 5.01[2][d] (stating that "there can be no con-
fidence with respect to public knowledge"). See 1 DECKER, supra note 105, at 85 ("Information that
is not confidential and can be obtained from other sources is not protectable.").
148. See Howard Schultz & Assocs. of the Southwest, Inc. v. Broniec, 236 S.E.2d 265, 270
(Ga. 1977).
149. See Mid-States Enters. v. House, 403 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Ky. 1966).
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Slijepcevich v. Caremark, Inc., No. 95C7286, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110, at *9
(N.D. Il1. Jan. 4, 1996) (refusing to enforce agreement lacking definition of confidential information);
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cannot fairly be enforced against employees, for "[o]ne restricted by
such a broad agreement cannot reasonably be expected to pick his or her
way across such intellectual land mines without inadvertently setting off
one or more."'' 53 Similarly, the employer also bears the burden in litiga-
tion of proving that the information sought to be protected is in fact con-
fidential. 54 Courts have refused to enforce nondisclosure agreements
where the employer "failed to identify with any degree of particularity
the alleged trade secrets or confidential information in need of protec-
tion." 55 If an employer cannot meet this burden, the nondisclosure agree-
ment cannot be enforced. 156
Without other restrictions, these straightforward and widely followed
limitations on nondisclosure agreements would permit a significant por-
tion of the kinds of disclosures made by employee-whistleblowers. First,
the exception permitting the use of general knowledge and skills will in
many cases allow former employees to serve as expert witnesses or in a
consulting capacity, insofar as such activities involve the offering of the
individual's informed opinion based on her accumulated general skill and
expertise. Second, the rule exempting publicly available information from
coverage would prevent an employer from using a nondisclosure agree-
ment to enjoin an individual who has already made public disclosures
from further disclosing the same information. In cases involving nondis-
closure agreements, courts have declined to enjoin the employee's disclo-
sures where doing so would amount to " 'locking the barn door after the
horse has been stolen.' "157 This rule prevents the whistleblower from be-
ing sidelined in the debate she has sparked.
Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 497 F Supp. 462, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (refusing to
enforce agreement not to reveal "secrets" where that term was defined to include all information
learned from the employer); Service Ctrs. of Chicago, Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (I11.
App. Ct. 1989) (refusing to enforce agreement with overboard def'iition of confidential information);
Disher v. Fulgoni, 514 N.E.2d 767, 779 (Il. App. Ct. 1987) (refusing to enforce nondisclosure agree-
ment containing "undefined restrictions"); Western Water Management, Inc. v. Heine, No. C4-95-
2693, 1996 Minn. App. LEXIS 532, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1996) (striking down nondisclo-
sure agreement where it failed to define what information was "confidential").
153. Disher, 514 N.E.2d at 780.
154. See, e.g., ASPELt u & BAKER, supra note 102, § 501[2][a] ("The burden of proof is on
the party claiming trade secret status.").
155. Service Ctrs. of Chicago, 535 N.E.2d at 1135.
156. As a consequence, employers drafting nondisclosure agreements for legitimate business
reasons should think carefully about the kinds of information they want to protect. The agreements
should be more narrowly drafted to provide employees some guidance about the kind of disclosures
that are prohibited.
157. Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 278 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
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The cases on nondisclosure agreements discussed in this section
make clear that confidentiality is a prerequisite to the enforcement of
nondisclosure agreements, and they provide some guidance on where the
outer limits of confidentiality lie. They do not, however, define what in-
formation is or is not confidential.
C. In Order to Protect Information as Confidential, the Employer Must
Prove That Its Release Would Harm the Employer's Competitive Interests
In order to protect information as confidential, the employer must
show that its disclosure would cause competitive harm. This means that
it would aid the employer's competitors at the employer's expense, or,
conversely, that it would hinder the employer in her ability to compete
with competitors. While few cases explicitly state this criterion, the vast
majority follow it or implicitly endorse it. In addition cases from analo-
gous areas of law illustrate the principle that competitive harm is the
touchstone of business confidentiality.
The types of information that courts deem confidential are almost
invariably of competitive value to the employer in the most traditional
sense-non-trade secret material such as customer lists, marketing infor-
mation and product development materials. 158 When enforcing nondisclo-
sure agreements in contexts where a former employee is using or disclos-
ing information in connection with new employment, courts have
emphasized that the agreement is being enforced to protect the employer
from competitive harm. 159 Moreover, courts have refused to enforce non-
disclosure agreements where disclosure of the information at issue could
not be used to harm the employer competitively.16 For instance, in Amer-
158. See, e.g., Overholt Crop. Ins. Serv. Co. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1991) (involv-
ing customer list); Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Ga., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 150 (Ga. 1973) (involv-
ing customer names and addresses and personnel data); Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667
A.2d 729, 734 (Pa. Super. 1995) (including corporate information such as overhead costs, profit mar-
gin, dealer discounts, customer pricing, marketing strategy and customer contract terms in category
of non-trade secret information); Bell Fuel Corp. v. Cattolico, 544 A.2d 450, 460-61 (Pa. Super.
1988) (customer information).
159. See, e.g., Roto-Die Co. v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (W.D. Va. 1995) (recognizing
that information such as customer lists, marketing information, and product development information,
"if disclosed to competitors, would destroy a company's ability to compete").
160. See, e.g., Slijepcevich v. Caremark, Inc., No. 95C7286, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110, at *4
(N.D. I11. Jan. 4, 1996) ("[C]ourts will enjoin former employees only when there is a threat that they
will disclose secret information to a competitor."); Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Koch Indus., Inc.,
497 F Supp. 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that the employer did not lose any business due to
disclosures and considering this as a factor militating against enforcement of the nondisclosure agree-
ment); Durham, 198 S.E.2d at 149 ("Covenants not to disclose and utilize confidential business in-
formation are related to general covenants not to compete because of the similar employer interest in
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ican Shippers Supply Co. v. Campbell,161 the employer considered its cus-
tomer lists confidential, yet the court refused to enforce a nondisclosure
agreement where "no evidence indicated these lists could have been used
to undercut competition." 162
The Sixth Circuit and the Eastern District of Michigan explicitly
disagreed with this position in Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson.163
In enjoining a former Uniroyal employee from revealing certain informa-
tion learned while employed by Uniroyal, the district court stated:
[The former employee] emphasizes that the agreements can only protect [the em-
ployer] from a true competitive injury. The Court has repeatedly disagreed with
that contention. The signed contract in question states that [the employee] 'will not
divulge Information to others.' It does not state that [the employee] 'will not di-
vulge Information to a competitor,' or that [the employee] 'will not disclose Infor-
mation which will cause a competitive injury." 64
However, while ostensibly rejecting competitive harm as fundamental to
the existence of confidential information, the district court nevertheless
justified the injunction it issued by reference to the competitive harm that
might result from disclosure: "The economic value of [the information at
issue] lies in the competitive advantage over others that [the employer]
enjoys by virtue of exclusive access to the data, and disclosure or use by
others of the data would destroy that competitive edge." 165 Affirming the
district court, the Sixth Circuit noted the court's finding that the informa-
tion at issue "could" find its way into the hands of competitors, 16 and
Uniroyal's basis for seeking injunctive relief was that "it would be
placed at a severe competitive disadvantage and was in imminent peril of
suffering significant competitive losses if its confidentiality agreements"
were not enforced. 67
Thus, despite their assertions to the contrary, the Uniroyal courts did
view competitive harm as an important element for enforcement of a
nondisclosure agreement. These seemingly contradictory positions can be
reconciled if the district court language rejecting the competitive harm
argument is read to mean simply that a nondisclosure agreement covers
maintaining competitive advantage.").
161. 456 N.E.2d 1040 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
162. Id. at 1044 (quoting Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 1983)).
163. 856 F. Supp. 348, 352 (E.D. Mich. 1994), aff'd, 97 F.3d 1452, No. 95-1130, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25322 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 1996) (unpublished table decision).
164. Id. (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 353 (emphasis added) (citing Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984)).
166. See Uniroyal, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25322, at *25.
167. Id. at *5.
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more than just disclosures made directly to a competitor. The courts'
analysis can be interpreted to mean that the information must be such
that, regardless where or to whom disclosed, it would cause the former
employer competitive harm if learned by a competitor. This position is
entirely consistent with the arguments advanced in this section.
Whatever can be gleaned from cases involving employment-related
nondisclosure agreements, there is little law directly addressing the mean-
ing of confidentiality in this context. So the precise parameters of the
term remain murky. In other contexts, however, courts have grappled di-
rectly with the issue of what makes business information confidential and
what kinds of harm are sufficient to warrant its protection.
For instance, courts construing the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) 68 have directly addressed the definition of confidentiality. These
courts have concluded that information is not confidential unless its re-
lease would cause competitive harm. FOIA requires government agencies
to release information in response to a public request unless the re-
quested information falls into one of nine enumerated exemptions. 69
FOIA Exemption 4 exempts from disclosure business materials that are
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential."'' 70 Courts interpreting this defini-
tion have made clear that the term " '[c]onfidential' . . . means more
than that the information would not customarily be available for public
perusal."' 7' Instead, courts have deemed information to be confidential
for purposes of Exemption 4 only if its release would cause "substantial
harm to the competitive position" of the business submitter. 72
The important point for competitive harm in the FOIA context ... is that it be
limited to harm flowing from the affirmative use of proprietary information by
competitors. Competitive harm should not be taken to mean simply any injury to
competitive position, as might flow from customer or employee disgruntlement or
from the embarrassing publicity attendant upon public revelations concerning, for
example, illegal or unethical payments to government officials or violations of civil
rights, environmental or safety laws. 73
168. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996 & Supp. 1998).
169. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
170. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (emphasis added).
171. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LMGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GovERNMEN
LAWs 84 (Allan Robert Adler ed., 20th ed. 1997).
172. National Parks and Conserv. Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (em-
phasis added).
173. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1291 n.30 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Mark Q. Connelly, Secrets and Smokescreens: A Legal and
Economic Analysis of Government Disclosures of Business Data, 1981 Wis. L REv. 207, 235-36);
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Courts have made clear that mere embarrassment attendant to a dis-
closure of secret information does not constitute substantial competitive
harm even if it is so severe that it could indirectly harm the company's
bottom line. 74 In General Electric Co. v. United States Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, General Electric (GE) unsuccessfully challenged the
NRC's threatened release to anti-nuclear activists of an internal GE report
criticizing some of its own nuclear reactor designs. 175 The court rejected
GE's assertion that the report was confidential under FOIA Exemption 4
because its release would cause the company competitive harm. 176 The
court reasoned that "the principal demanders of the report are opponents
of nuclear power, who would like to embarrass the entire industry rather
than shift business from [one producer to another]."' 177 As such, any
harm attendant to the disclosure would not be "competitive."' 7
Similarly, the harm whistleblowers may inflict on a company is not
competitive harm, because their disclosures are not calculated to disad-
vantage their employers vis a vis competitors. Jeffrey Wigand did not
disclose information about Brown & Williamson in the hopes of increas-
ing sales of Phillip Morris products. Although such revelations may harm
the employer's reputation, and even its bottom line, these kinds of inju-
ries do not represent competitive harm as that term has been interpreted
under FOIA.
Similarly, a showing of competitive harm is also a prerequisite to
obtaining a protective order where embarrassment or harm to reputation
is the primary injury asserted by the employer. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c), a protective order maintaining the confidentiality
of designated court filings may be granted upon good cause to protect a
party from, among other things, "embarrassment."' 79 Unlike FOIA Ex-
emption 4, this Rule explicitly permits parties to obtain a remedy where
the sole injury is embarrassment. Nevertheless, in applying this Rule,
courts have recognized that the harm of embarrassment is not the same
for corporations as it is for individuals. 180 Where a corporation is con-
see also CNA Financial Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that unfa-
vorable publicity is not a competitive injury).
174. See General Elec. Co. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1403
(7th Cir. 1984).
175. See id. at 1396.
176. See id. at 1402-03.
177. Id. at 1403.
178. See id.
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
180. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986).
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cerned, reputational injury is measured in terms of competitive harm:
As embarrassment is usually thought of as a nonmonetizable harm to individuals, it
may be especially difficult for a business enterprise, whose primary measure of
well-being is presumably monetizable, to argue for a protective order on this
ground.... [rio succeed, a business will have to show with some specifilcity that
the embarrassment resulting from dissemination of the information would cause a
significant harm to its competitive and financial position.18'
Under this standard, courts have found that even real economic injuries,
such as stock price fluctuation and damage to general business standing,
do not rise to the level necessary to show competitive harm. 82 The case
law on protective orders reflects the reality, recognized implicitly by
courts construing nondisclosure agreements, that where corporations are
concerned, concepts like embarrassment and reputation have little mean-
ing apart from competitive injury. Thus, to articulate a legitimate busi-
ness interest deserving of protection, a corporate employer must articulate
an interest bearing on its competitive position.
In sum, in order to establish that information is confidential for pur-
poses of protection by a nondisclosure agreement, the employer must
show more than the secrecy of the information in question. It also must
show that disclosure may reveal to competitors something that would en-
able them to better compete with the employer. In a legitimate challenge
to disclosures of trade secrets or bona fide confidential business informa-
tion, the employer will have little trouble making this showing. As dis-
cussed above, the vast majority of cases easily meet these criteria even if
they do not make the criteria explicit. However, in a suit against a
whistleblower to silence accusations of wrongdoing, it would be ex-
tremely difficult for an employer to show that information about its own
secret misdeeds should be protected as confidential under this standard.
Consequently, the standard strikes the appropriate balance between pro-
tection of the employer, protection of the whistleblower, and protection
of the consuming public.
I. CONCLUSION
While employee nondisclosure agreements remain an important tool
for employers to protect trade secrets and confidential business informa-
tion from competitors, they should not be used to prevent a
whistleblower from informing the public about wrongdoing. This is espe-
181. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
182. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 90 (D.NJ. 1986).
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cially true when that wrongdoing implicates public health and safety.
Nondisclosure agreements should never be used to prevent a
whistleblower from testifying as to non-privileged and non-trade secret
matters in civil litigation. And outside the litigation context, nondisclo-
sure agreements should be enforced only to the extent they are reasona-
ble. This means that they can be used only to further the employer's le-
gitimate interest in protecting trade secrets or confidential information
that would cause the employer competitive harm if revealed. Most
whistleblower disclosures do not fall within these parameters.
It has been observed that our society has a deep need to "project
onto whistle-blowers our need for heroism, when revenge and anger are
often what drive them."' 83 It cannot be denied that there are disgruntled
employees who would spread lies about their employers to exact ven-
geance for some imagined wrong, and admittedly, there are risks to the
approach proposed in this Article. Nevertheless, while these risks exist,
there are remedies available. Employers already have legal recourse
against employees who defame them, and pursuing a defamation action
would not be significantly more taxing on the employer's resources than
litigating the validity of a nondisclosure agreement. In contrast, consum-
ers no satisfactory means to uncover wrongdoing that a corrupt and
wealthy corporation has marshaled its resources to hide. To mitigate this
imbalance and protect the important interests at stake, courts should not
permit employers to misuse nondisclosure agreements as tools of
deception.
183. Brenner, supra note 3, at 174.
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